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Abstract
The theme of this Article addresses an area of European Union (”EU”) law that has witnessed
continuing complex questions for regulation: the role of law in the evolving processes of control-
ling dominance through competition laws in the liberalized markets of Europe. These markets
offer new challenges for competition law, especially where new business platforms emerge. These
markets also present new challenges in identifying how far a private law right of freedom to con-
tract and rights to property can be reconciled with the demise of the state in providing essential
services to citizens and the replacement of such services with new universal obligations provided
by state and non-state (private) undertakings. Europe is in an exciting period of addressing a move
away from a purely formal application of its laws on dominant positions to and a move closer
towards a U.S.-style, effects-based approach. This Article sets the European debate in its legal and
political context in order to address the challenges facing Europe.
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INTRODUCTION 
Fittingly for this tribute to Lord Slynn of Hadley, the last 
time Lord Slynn and I met was at the Fordham University School 
of Law, at the conference entitled “Fifty Years of European 
Community Law,” organized by Roger Goebel in February 2008.1 
Our paths had crossed many times, from early appearances in the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal in England, to the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in Luxembourg, and at academic 
conferences and in training sessions in the central and eastern 
European Accession States, especially in Slovenia, one of Lord 
Slynn’s favorite places for academic debate on European Union 
(“EU”) law and fine wines. 
Lord Slynn was particularly adept at seeing the changes the 
enlargement of the EU would usher in. The theme of this Article 
addresses an area of EU law that has witnessed dramatic changes 
in the last decade of Lord Slynn’s life and poses continuing 
complex questions for regulation: the role of law in the evolving 
processes of controlling dominance through competition laws in 
the liberalized markets of Europe. These markets offer new 
challenges for competition law, especially where new business 
platforms emerge, but also in identifying how far a private law 
right of freedom to contract and rights to property can be 
reconciled with the demise of the state in providing essential 
services to citizens and the replacement of such services with new 
universal obligations provided by state and non-state (private) 
undertakings. Europe is in an exciting period of addressing a 
move away from a purely formal application of its laws on 
dominant positions to moving closer to a U.S.-style, effects-based 
 
*   Jean Monnet Professor of European Law ad personam; Director of the Centre for 
European Law and Integration; Barrister, Littleton Chambers, Temple, London. 
1. The conference papers are published in 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1097, 1097–772 
(2008) & 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 345, 345–730 (2009). 
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approach. In recent years there has been more litigation against 
dominant firms not only by competitors, but also by national and 
regional regulatory bodies. This is particularly true in the United  
States and Europe,2 where mergers and alleged anti-competitive 
conduct by dominant firms supplying essential goods and services 
may have an impact on economic development and innovation 
throughout the whole business food chain and the national 
economy. This, in turn, has led to a greater role for the courts in 
shaping a policy response to the regulation of dominant firms. 
Eager to claim back the policy initiative, regulators have 
considered guidelines for prioritizing and identifying the most 
important forms of anticompetitive behavior, which should be 
tackled by legal enforcement. 
The topic has significance for trans-Atlantic audiences where 
similar debates ensue over the role of guidelines in the level and 
effectiveness of regulation of dominant firms in competitive 
markets.3 This Article sets the European debate in its legal and 
political context in order to address the challenges facing 
Europe. 
I. THE EUROPEAN LANDSCAPE 
The date for the completion of the Single European Market, 
December 31, 1992, marks a significant turning point for the 
modernization and direction of competition law in Europe. The 
following decade saw a wave of liberalization and privatization of 
markets previously owned, regulated, or controlled by state 
intervention,4 alongside restructuring, merger and acquisition 
activity which allowed non-EU firms to enter and trade in EU 
markets previously protected from competition. The internal 
 
2. Seen, for example, in the recent use of competition law against Intel, Microsoft, 
and Qualcomm in both the United States and the European Union (“EU”). 
3. The Obama administration pledged to address dominance after years of alleged 
neglect under the Bush administration. See Don Clark & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Silicon 
Valley Girds for New Antitrust Regime, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2009, at B1. In the United 
States, as in Europe, there is a lack of consensus on how to regulate dominance, seen 
most vividly in the differences between the Department of Justice, which has attempted 
to produce guidelines, and members of the Federal Trade Commission. See Diane Bartz, 
US Justice Dept Issues Monopoly Guide; FTC Dissents, REUTERS, Sept. 8, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/ article/ idUSN0845441220080908. 
4. See ERIKA SZYSZCZAK, THE REGULATION OF THE STATE IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ch. 1 (2007). 
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market provisions were used to start the process of liberalization, 
but competition rules, especially articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
(formerly articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (“EC Treaty”))5 are viewed as the 
 
5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
arts. 101, 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88–89 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 81, 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, 
at 70–71 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Two provisions of the original Treaty of Rome 
(“Treaty establishing the European Economic Community” or “EEC Treaty”) addressed 
the control of market power in what is now the EU: first, article 86 EEC, which was re-
numbered article 82 EC and is now article 101 TFEU; and second, article 90 EEC, which 
was re-numbered article 86 EC and is now article 106 TFEU. Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community arts. 86, 90, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 
[hereinafter ECC Treaty]; EC Treaty, supra, arts. 82, 86, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74–75, 76; 
TFEU, supra, arts. 101, 106, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 88–91. A separate provision addressed 
cartels and agreements and concerted practices: article 85 EEC, which was renumbered 
as article 81 EC and is now, after the Treaty of Lisbon, article 101 TFEU. EEC Treaty, art. 
85, at 31; EC Treaty, supra, art. 81, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 70–71; TFEU, supra, art. 101, 
2008 O.J. C 115, at 88–89. This Article uses the new numbering of the competition law 
provisions which came into operation after the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified in 2009. 
Article 101 TFEU (formerly article 81 EC) states: 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member 
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those 
which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical 
development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion 
of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be 
automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in 
the case of: any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, any 
concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical 
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
TFEU, supra, art. 101 2008 O.J. C 115, at 88–89; EC Treaty, supra, art. 81, 2006 O.J. C 321 
E, at 70–71. Article 102 TFEU (formerly article 82 EC) states: 
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crowbar, or can opener, for greater market liberalization. The 
move towards the liberalization of markets allowed for innovation 
in research and development, the creation of new consumer 
markets, and increased expectations from consumers in such 
markets. This in turn created new sites for the application of law, 
for example, in the relationship between competition and 
regulation in the EU internal market, the role of the Commission 
in the enforcement of the competition rules, and through 
sectoral inquiries, the enforcement and settlement6 of 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or 
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts. 
TFEU, supra, art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89; EC Treaty, supra, art. 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, 
at 88. 
6. See, e.g., Steve Lohr & James Kanter, A.M.D.-Intel Settlement Won’t End Their Woes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at B1 (discussing the recent settlement between Intel and its 
competitor, Advanced Micro Devices); Commission Press Release, IP/09/1941 (Dec. 16, 
2009) (describing the Microsoft/Commission settlement on web browser choice); Press 
Release, NEC, NEC Withdraws its Complaint Submitted to the European Commission 
Relating to Qualcomm’s Licensing Practice (Nov. 24, 2009). 
The Commission may also settle competition investigations and complaints by 
the use of commitments. Cf. Alrosa v. Commission, Case T-170/06, [2007] E.C.R. II-
2601, ¶ 1 (noting the challenge to commitments). Commitments have been undertaken 
in the utilities sector as a means of opening up markets and making them competitive. 
The Commission opened an investigation into the French dominant firm Gaz de France 
SA. The potential infringement consists of behavior that might prevent or reduce 
competition on downstream supply markets for natural gas in France through, in 
particular, a combination of long-term reservation of transport capacity and a network 
of import agreements, as well as through underinvestment in import infrastructure 
capacity. These suspected practices, constituting possible infringements of articles 101 
and 102 TFEU (articles 81 and 82 EC), were allegedly engaged in by Gaz de France SA, 
its subsidiaries and companies under its control. Commission Press Release, 
MEMO/08/328 (May 22, 2008). 
The Commission adopted an article 9 decision under Regulation No. 1/2003 
that renders legally binding commitments offered by the French energy company GDF 
Suez to boost competition in the French gas market. In particular, the commitments 
address Commission concerns that GDF Suez may have closed off competitors from 
access to gas import capacity into France in breach of EU rules on abuse of a dominant 
market position. GDF Suez offered a major structural reduction of its long-term 
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competition disputes, and the private settlement of disputes 
between competitors and regulators, with new remedies for 
monitoring and enforcement. Of significance in Europe is the 
special role of incumbents in the newly liberalized markets, 
especially where their commercial activities overlap with 
supplying traditional services of general economic interest, 
renamed “universal service obligations” in the liberalization 
legislation7 and with public service obligations in state aid law.8 
This in turn has created new roles for competition law, 
particularly in the debate on the balance between public and 
private enforcement of competition law, the balance between 
regulation and competition law principles,9 and whether 
competition law and regulation may be used to fulfill socio-
economic objectives in European integration.10 
This explosion of new economic actors and economic 
relationships created pressures for the structure of the EU 
 
reservations on French gas import infrastructure capacity. Commission Press Release, 
IP/09/1097 (July 8, 2009); see also Commission Press Release, MEMO/09/567 (Dec. 17, 
2009). 
7. See Jim Davies & Erika Szyszczak, Universal Service Obligations and Public Service 
Obligations in Liberalised Markets, in DEVELOPMENTS IN SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST 
(Erika Szyszczak et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2011). 
8. See generally Altmark Trans GmbH v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, 
Case C-280/00, [2000] E.C.R. I-7747. 
9. For example, as a result of the Microsoft decision and the cases on margin 
squeezes in the telecommunications sector, the Commission is increasingly turning 
competition law into a de facto price regulation tool, even where liberalized sectors are 
subject to regulation. See, e.g., Hearing Officer Final Report COMP/38.784, Wanadoo 
España v. Telefónica, 2008 O.J. C 83/3; Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, Case T-
271/03, [2008] E.C.R. II-477; Telefónica and Telefónica España v. Commission, Case T-
336/07 (CFI Sept. 10, 2007) (not yet reported); see also Opinion of Advocate General 
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Commission v. Poland, Case C-227/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-8403. The 
opinion concerns the regulation of the liberalized telecommunications sector and the 
application of the Access Directive to regulate interconnection. Council Directive No. 
2002/19/EC, 2002 O.J. L 108/7. It also illuminates the contradiction in stimulating the 
opening-up process by imposing a statutory obligation to negotiate access to the 
networks without first analyzing whether the competitive process needs such 
intervention and where such intervention may stifle the spontaneity of agreements. See 
Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, TeliaSonera Finland Oyj, Case C-
192/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-____ (delivered May 14, 2009) (not yet reported). 
10. The wider public policy role for competition law has focused upon article 101 
TFEU, and it is only in the process of modernization that a wider, consumer welfare 
interest in article 102 TFEU has started a debate on the role of controlling dominance 
in the market. As will be seen later in this Article, part of the new constitutional 
settlement of the EU has been to create a balance between social and economic 
priorities and to constitutionalize a set of European fundamental values. 
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internal market and was accompanied by a realization of the 
need to modernize EU competition law. The overall approach to 
modernization has been slow and piecemeal with attention 
focused upon improving the procedural aspects of the 
enforcement of competition law, rather than wider discussions of 
the substantive content and policy role of competition law.11 The 
latter has been addressed in a less unified manner,12 through the 
evolution of Commission policy and the ECJ’s case law, and more 
recently by a Commission staff paper,13 a report from the 
Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (“EAGCP”),14 
and guidelines on article 102 TFEU.15 Article 86 EC (now article 
106 TFEU) attracted even less attention, and yet its role in 
linking state monopolies and undertakings that are granted 
special and exclusive rights is linked with article 102 TFEU by 
ensuring that state intervention in competitive markets is subject 
to the rules of competition where an economic activity is 
involved16 and the state intervention is not designed to supply a 
 
11. See David J. Gerber, Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, 31 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1235, 1256, 1263 (2008) (analyzing the procedural and substantive 
processes of modernization in competition law). 
12. See THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES (Ioannis Lianos 
& Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2009) (discussing outstanding issues in competition law). 
13. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG COMPETITION DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE 
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES (2005), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2010). 
14. JORDI GAUL ET AL., REPORT BY THE EAGCP: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO 
ARTICLE 82 EC (July 2005), available at, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
15. Commission Communication, 2009 O.J. C 45/7 (Guidance on the 
Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings). 
16. See Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Südwestpfalz, Case C-475/99, 
[2001] E.C.R. I-8089 (holding an organization providing emergency patient transport 
services to be engaged in economic activity and subject to competition rules); Höfner v. 
Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-1979 (finding a public employment 
agency to be engaged in economic activity subject to competition law). On the other 
hand, public interest tasks not engaged in economic activity are shielded from EU 
economic law. See Calì v. Servizi ecologici porto di Genova SpA, Case C-343/95, [1997] 
E.C.R. I-1547 (ruling anti-pollution surveillance fulfils a task typically belonging to a 
public authority and therefore is not economic activity subject to competition law); SAT 
Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-43 (holding 
Eurocontrol, a company engaged in activities typically within the public authority, does 
not engage in an undertaking subject to article 106 TFEU). The concept of solidarity is 
also used to protect social and welfare activities from the full application of economic 
law. See British United Provident Association Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-289/03, [2008] 
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service of general economic interest.17 The case law on article 
106 TFEU continues to be sparse, its modern focus being not so 
much upon the interaction of article 106 TFEU with article 102 
TFEU and the consequent concept of abuse of a dominant 
position, but on the funding of services of general economic 
interest and the interaction with the procurement rules and state 
aid.18 
The last decade has seen a remarkable focus globally in 
addressing the question of how to regulate market power and 
identify when market power is abused. In the EU this debate has 
been captured in academic commentary on Commission policy 
and European court judgments, filtered through the program of 
“modernization” of competition law, and more recently in 
political debate over the appropriate balance between an 
“economic” agenda in which competitive markets play a central 
part, and a “social” and “fundamental rights” dimension. 
A theme of the modernization agenda has been to move 
away from a formal enforcement agenda toward an effects-based, 
economic approach to the enforcement of competition law in 
Europe. Article 102 TFEU (article 82 EC) was the subject of 
 
E.C.R. II-81 (discussing the criteria considered for deciding which state services are 
those of general economic interest); Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología 
Sanitaria v. Commission, Case C-205/03P, [2006] E.C.R. I-6295, ¶ 8 (arguing that the 
Spanish health system “operates according to the principle of solidarity in that it is 
funded from social security contributions and other State funding and provides services 
free of charge to its members on the basis of universal cover”); AOK Bundesverband v. 
Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Case C-264/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-2493, ¶ 65 (holding 
“groups of sickness funds . . . do not constitute undertakings or associations of 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC when they determine fixed maximum 
amounts corresponding to the upper limit of the price of medicinal products whose cost 
is borne by sickness funds”); Cisal di Battistello Venanzio v. Instituto nazionale per 
l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro, Case C-218/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-691 
(holding that the Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavori 
“fulfils an exclusively social function” and is therefore not engaged in economic activity 
subject to competition law); Poucet v. Assurances Générales de France, Joined Cases C-
159/91 & C-160/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-666 (ruling that certain organizations charged with 
the management of social security schemes do not fall within the concept of 
undertaking as described in articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty). 
17. See British United Provident Association Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-289/03, 
[2008] E.C.R. II-81, ¶ 1 (“[A] State measure necessary for the protection of a mission of 
general economic interest could not be characterised as State aid.”); THE CHANGING 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST IN EUROPE: BETWEEN 
COMPETITION AND SOLIDARITY (Markus Krajewski et al. eds., 2009). 
18. For a discussion of these two topics, see SZYSZCZAK, supra note 4, at chs. 6–7. 
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scrutiny first by the Global Competition Law Centre,19 second by 
a series of roundtable discussions organized by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development during the 2000s, 
and third by the EAGCP.20 Finally, the Commission published a 
staff discussion paper on article 82 EC in 2005.21 The paper was 
not a consultative document, but nevertheless attracted comment 
from over one hundred practitioners and academics,22 with the 
Commission conducting a public hearing in June 2006.23 The 
document was controversial and did not attract consensus, even 
within the Commission. After a lapse of three years, on 
December 3, 2008, the Commission adopted a guidance paper24 
to set out its enforcement priorities on article 102 TFEU. Unlike 
the other documents, the guidance paper was not subject to 
consultation or comment before its release. The legal status of 
this guidance is untested25 and the institutional capacity of the 
Commission to deliver policy changes has been questioned. 
 
19. GLOBAL LAW COMPETITION CENTRE, RESEARCH PAPERS ON ARTICLE 82 EC 
(2005) available at http://www.coleurop.be/ content/ gclc/ documents/ 
GCLC%20Research%20Papers%20on%20Article%2082%20EC.pdf. 
20. GAUL ET AL., supra note 14. 
21. European Commission, supra note 13. 
22. See European Commission, Article 82 Review, Comments on the public 
consultation on discussion paper on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses 
(March 2006) available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/
contributions.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2010) (listing the responses to the public 
consultation of the Paper). 
22. See European Commission, Article 82 Review, Public Hearing on Article 82, 
June 14, 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/
hearing.html (providing video recordings of the hearing). 
24. Commission Communication, supra note 15, 2009 O.J. C 45/7. 
25. Indeed, in the Intel decision, the Commission stated that the guidance paper is 
not intended as a statement of law and that the ultimate interpretation of article 102 
TFEU rests with the General Court and ECJ. Commission Decision No. COMP/37.990, 
slip op. ¶ 916 (Eur. Comm’n May 13, 2009), available at http:// ec.europa.eu/
competition/sectors/ICT/ intel_provisional_decision.pdf (provisional non-confidential 
version). The Commission states further that the guidance paper is intended to set 
priorities for future enforcement, and does not apply to cases initiated before the 
publication of the guidance paper. Id. See also the warning delivered by Advocate 
General Kokott: 
  Vodafone argues that an answer to the first question is unnecessary as the 
legal position has already been clarified by the interpretation guidelines 
published by the Commission. On that point, it must be observed, first, that 
communications from the Commission are not legally binding and, therefore, 
are incapable of anticipating interpretation by the Court in the course of 
proceedings under Article 234 EC. Second, even if the legal position is clear, a 
reference for a preliminary ruling is admissible; there is at most the possibility 
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The focus upon the Commission’s enforcement strategy, 
however, only tells half the story, since the history of the 
enforcement of abuse of a dominant position in the EU is one 
not so much of public enforcement strategies, but of private 
litigation, often at the national level, brought by complaints from 
competitors. 
The EU position on how to control dominance in the market 
is different from other competition and antitrust regimes 
because of the need to control both private and public power in 
the market place, as well as devise the framework for the 
regulation of hybrid forms of power, where different degrees of 
public and private economic activity provide essential welfare and 
public services in competitive, liberalized markets. Yet, in both 
the public and private regulatory models there is a lack of clarity 
in the objectives of the regulation of dominant positions in 
Europe. 
II. THE FUTURE ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU 
The debate over the regulation of dominance in the EU 
needs to be set against the historical and cultural background of 
the rapid economic changes that have taken place in Europe 
over the last twenty years. The original numbering of the articles 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
may have changed, but the content of the competition law 
provisions in the basic treaty provisions has defied any significant 
rewording. Instead, the Commission was entrusted with the 
flexibility and evolution of competition law through day-to-day 
management of case handling and policy-making, enforcement 
and the use of soft governance techniques in the form of notices, 
communications, or staff papers. These processes gave flexibility 
to the evolution of competition law, but they lacked transparency 
and democratic input, and have been criticized where the 
Commission allegedly attempts to change the direction of 
competition policy. 
 
that the Court might give its decision by reasoned order in accordance with 
Article 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van 
de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Case C-8/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-4529, ¶ 29. 
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The European Courts (originally the Court of First Instance 
(“CFI”) but after the Treaty of Lisbon renamed the General 
Court) and the European Court of Justice review the legality of 
the Commission’s actions and through the preliminary ruling 
procedure of article 267 TFEU (article 234 EC) provide 
definitions and guiding principles on the application of 
competition law in Europe. However, the use of Article 267 
TFEU has resulted in ad hoc case law. Judicial review focuses on 
the Commission’s use of its power and assessment of evidence by 
the General Court. This review has occurred without the benefit 
of the Advocates’ General input into the wider teleological 
consequences of a ruling. Consequently, the case law has a 
limited role in determining a normative element to competition 
law. 
Over the years, competition law has moved through the 
hierarchy of EC Treaty rules to establish itself as a fundamental 
part of the establishment of an internal market.26 Article 3(1)(g) 
EC stated: “[T]he activities of the Community shall include . . . a 
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted.”27 The ECJ has described this as a “fundamental 
provision.”28 In ADBHU, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he 
principles of free movement of goods and competition, together 
with freedom of trade as a fundamental right, are general 
principles of Community law, of which the Court ensures 
observance.”29 
Thus competition policy has traditionally been seen as 
complementing and promoting the aims of European 
integration.30 This inevitably creates conflicts where states wish to 
promote a stronger interventionist economic agenda and when 
interest groups express a political view that free markets may not 
 
26. See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, Case C-126/97, [1999] 
E.C.R. I-3055, ¶ 36(“according to . . . Article 3(1)(g) EC, Article 81 of the Treaty 
constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the 
tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal 
market.”). 
27. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 
3(1)(g), 2002 O.J. C 325/33, at 40 [hereinafter EC Treaty 2002 Consolidated Version]. 
28. Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, Case C-453/99, [2001] E.C.R. I–6297, ¶ 20. 
29. Procureur de la République v. Ass’n de défense des brûleurs d’huiles usagées, 
Case 240/83, [1985] E.C.R. 531, ¶ 9. 
30. Claus Dieter Ehlermann, The Contribution of EC Competition Policy to the Single 
Market, 29 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 257, 259 (1992). 
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always be the best vehicle for delivering a social agenda. 
Competition policy has also assumed a role in promoting various 
EU polices, for example environmental protection, social 
protection, and industrial policy. In relation to article 102 TFEU, 
the objectives of controlling dominance in the market have not 
been articulated in a clear or coherent manner. Indeed, 
O’Donaghue and Padilla argue that it was not until the 
Commission’s staff discussion paper of 2005 that the Commission 
set out the core objectives of article 102 TFEU, and then only in 
relation to exclusionary abuses.31 
A. The Treaty of Lisbon of 2009: Downgrading Competition? 
The objectives of competition law have been affected by the 
Treaty of Lisbon. This treaty changed the status of competition 
law by removing it from one of the activities of the EU.32 The EC 
Treaty was largely reproduced in the TFEU, with the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”) setting out the fundamental 
principles on which the EU is based.33 Article 3(3) TEU states, 
“[t]he Union shall establish an internal market.”34 Thus, in the 
new legal order, references to a system of undistorted 
competition have been deleted in the treaties’ main bodies. 
Instead, competition is mentioned in Protocol No. 27 on the 
internal market and competition.35 Barents asks whether the 
removal of the principle of undistorted competition to one of the 
“barns” of the treaties has removed the constitutional value of 
competition law as one of the cornerstones of the economic 
constitution of the EU.36 
 
31. ROBERT O’DONOGHUE & A JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
ARTICLE 82 EC 4 (2006). 
32. Article 3(1)(g) EC had stated that “the activities of the Community shall 
include a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted.” EC 
Treaty 2002 Consolidated Version, supra note 27. 
33. TFEU, supra note 5, O.J. C 115; EC Treaty, supra note 5, 2006 O.J. C 321 E; 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/13 
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. 
34. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 33, art. 3(3), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 17. 
35. Id. Protocol 27, at 309. 
36. René Barents, Constitutional Horse Trading: Some Comments on the Protocol, in 
VIEWS OF EUROPEAN LAW FROM THE MOUNTAIN 123, 126 (Bulterman et al. eds., 2009). 
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A protocol has the same legal status as the TFEU and is 
considered an integral part of the treaty.37 The background 
history to the Treaty of Lisbon suggests that there was a 
deliberate political attempt to downgrade the role of competition 
in the EU. The relegation of competition to a protocol was 
engineered by interventions by President Sarkozy of France, who 
not only gave a rhetorical denunciation of the focus of European 
integration in favoring economic considerations over social 
welfare goals,38 but also suggested that competition law should be 
refocused in favor of a national industrial policy.39 In response, 
the then Commissioner for competition policy, Neelie Kroes, 
gave a sharp response: it would be business as usual.40 
 
37. According to Article 51 TEU, “[t]he Protocols and Annexes to the Treaties 
shall form an integral part thereof.” 
38. Support for greater emphasis on integration’s social aspects had already been 
seen in the earlier, difficult adoption of Directive 2006/123/EC, 2006 O.J. L 376/36 and 
in the Polish interventions in the original draft of a treaty establishing a European 
constitution. The perceived conflict over prioritizing the economic over the social has 
been an enduring feature of European integration since the Paris Summit of 1972 and 
highlighted in raw debates over the content of EU treaties and secondary law, as well 
what is perceived as the bias in court judgments. 
39. At a press interview speaking of the Protocol, Sarkozy is reported as saying: 
This perhaps gives a little more humanity to Europe. Because as an ideology, 
as dogma, what did competition give to Europe? It has given less and less to 
the people who vote at the European elections, and less and less to the people 
who believe in Europe. There was perhaps a need to reflect. I believe in 
competition, I believe in markets, but I believe in competition as a means and 
not an end in itself. This may also give a different legal direction to the 
Commission. That of a competition that is there to support the emergence of 
European champions, to carry out a true industrial policy. 
Alan Riley, The EU Reform Treaty and the Competition Protocol: Undermining EC 
Competition Law, CEPS POLICY BRIEF (Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels), 
Sept. 2009, at 4 (quoting President Sarkozy). 
40. Neelie Kroes said: 
An Internal Market without competition rules would be an empty shell—nice 
words, but no concrete results. 
The Protocol on Internal Market and Competition agreed at the European 
Council clearly repeats that competition policy is fundamental to the Internal 
Market. It retains the existing competition rules which have served us so well 
for 50 years. It re-confirms the European Commission’s duties as the 
independent competition enforcement authority for Europe. 
Now I would like to get back to the job. The Commission will continue to 
enforce Europe’s competition rules firmly and fairly: to bust cartels and 
monopolies, to vet mergers, to control state subsidies. That is in the interests 
of our Internal Market. It is in the interests of European citizens and 
consumers, it is what Europe’s business community quite rightly expects and 
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The Commission’s views on policy setting and on 
prioritizing antitrust law enforcement are confusing in the light 
of modern competition law’s aims. While embarking upon a 
modernization program, the Commission, in official policy 
documents and in practice, has not necessarily changed its old 
approach of protecting “competition on the merits.”41 The 
Commissioner’s response does not address whether removing 
article 3(1)(g) EC from the treaty’s main body affects the aims of 
controlling dominance in the market by ensuring that there is 
competition, that markets are not foreclosed, and that barriers to 
an integrated market are not created.42 It also does not answer 
the question as to whether the modernization process in EU 
competition law will move closer to the U.S. model for antitrust 
law of a consumer-welfare-as-economic-efficiency approach, 
which the Commission argues motivates the EU modernization 
process. Although the Commission can attempt an enforcement 
agenda, the litigation agenda will continue to be dominated by 
complaints from private bodies, usually competitors, and 
attention will be focused on the European courts’ responses to 
the challenges posed by changing markets. Courts will play an 
important role in defining the EU’s values in the future. After 
decades of neglect, the provisions addressing dominance in the 
market have moved to the spotlight as issues of consumer welfare 
in private markets and of competition in public markets take a 
significant place in the discourse on the role of modern 
competition law. 
 
deserves, and it is a firm foundation for Europe’s prosperity, notably by 
ensuring fair conditions for international investment. 
Neelie Kroes, European Commission for Competition, Statement on results of June 21–
22 European Council—Protocol on Internal Market and Competition (June 23, 2007). 
41. This phrase is used in Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in 
applying article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings, supra note 15, ¶¶ 1, 6, and by then Competition Commissioner Neelie 
Kroes at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute. Neelie Kroes, Preliminary Thoughts on 
Policy Review of Article 82, Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Sept. 23, 
2005); see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Competition on the Merits, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP(2005)27 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf. 
42. See Kroes, supra note 41. 
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III. ARTICLE 102 TFEU (ARTICLE 82 EC): THE QUIET LIFE 
Article 102 TFEU (article 82 EC) does not prevent holding a 
dominant position, but it does prevent abuse of such a position.43 
Although article 102 TFEU does not contain exemptions or 
justifications, the ECJ has held that conduct that prima facie 
infringes article 102 TFEU may be objectively justified where a 
dominant firm is acting in a proportionate manner to protect its 
own commercial interests44 or to ensure safety.45 In the 
Commission’s 2005 discussion paper, the Commission added a 
new justification where a dominant firm can show that its 
conduct produces efficiencies that outweigh the negative effects 
on competition.46 This is known as the “efficiency defense” and is 
recognized in U.S. law.47 
In the European Economic Community’s (“EEC”) early 
years, enforcement of article 102 TFEU was almost non-existent.48 
The few cases that reached the Commission and the courts were 
characterized primarily by the use of article 102 TFEU (article 82 
EC) against non-EU multinational firms.49 A leading 
commentator, René Joliet, who later became judge at the Court 
of Justice, argued that the original article 102 TFEU was designed 
 
43. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 47; EC Treaty, supra note 5, 
art. 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 37. 
44. United Brands Co. and United Brands Cont’l B.V. v. Commission, Case C-
27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, ¶¶ 189–90. 
45. Hilti AG v. Commission, Case C-53/92P, [1994] E.C.R. I-667. 
46. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 13, ¶ 77. 
47. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 209 (2003). 
48. See generally I. Samkalden & I.E. Druker, Legal Problems Relating to Article 86 of the 
Rome Treaty, 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 158 (1966). The first Commission decisions were 
against GEMA I, GEMA II, GEMA III, and Continental Can. Commission Decision No. 
71/224/EEC, [1971] O.J. L 134/15 (GEMA I); Commission Decision No. 72/268/EEC, 
[1972] O.J. L 166/22 (GEMA II); Commission Decision No. 82/204/EEC, [1981] O.J. L 
94/12 (GEMA III); Commission Decision No. 72/21/CEE, [1971] O.J. L 7 (Continental 
Can). 
49. See, e.g., Hugin Kassaregister AB & Hugin Cash Registers Ltd. v. Commission, 
Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869 (a Swedish firm before accession); United Brands v. 
Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207; Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & 
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 
223. See also Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Commission, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619 
(a UK firm before UK accession). The Imperial Chemical Insdustries case is especially 
interesting since it involved the use of article 101 TFEU against a multinational firm 
accused of concerted practices in an oligopolistic market, a forerunner of the attempts 
to identify issues of tacit collusion and joint dominance under article 102 TFEU. See id. 
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to tackle only exploitative conduct, as reflected in the original 
French and German versions of the EEC Treaty.50 Appeals 
against the Commission decisions revolved around the legality of 
the Commission’s actions and procedures and left few 
opportunities for the Court to develop a coherent jurisprudence 
on the policy underpinning article 102 TFEU as the Court’s  
attention was turned to the definitions involved in the skeletal 
provisions of article 102 TFEU. 
The handful of cases emanating from disputes at the 
national level reached the Court via article 267 TFEU (article 234 
EC).51 Many of the cases involved intellectual property rights, 
raising questions of whether such rights should be addressed by 
specialized concepts and whether a normative dimension can be 
applied from these rulings to all cases of abuse of a dominant 
position. As Vickers points out, reliance on litigation neglected 
the normative dimension to controlling dominance in the 
internal market; “there would be a danger that competition law 
towards abuse of dominance could become a set of ad hoc and 
unpredictable rules that are consistent neither with each other 
nor with the policy goals of the law.”52 
The disadvantages of using litigation as the policy approach 
for controlling abuse of a dominant position in the EU are seen 
in cases which extended the scope of article 102 TFEU beyond 
the natural wording to include changes to the structure of the 
market.53 Unlike section 2 of the Sherman Act of 1890,54 which 
captures behavior that may result in the acquisition of monopoly 
power, article 102 TFEU only captures behavior once a dominant 
position exists.55 There was also an underlying question about 
when article 102 TFEU should be used. Criticism was leveled at 
the implementation of article 102 TFEU through litigation. The 
 
50. RENE JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION (1970). 
For a detailed discussion of the early intentions of the drafters of the EEC Treaty, see P. 
Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC, 29 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 267 
(2009). 
51. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 267, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 164; EC Treaty, supra note 5, 
art. 234, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 147–48. 
52. John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F244, F247 (2005). 
53. See, e.g., Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, Joined 
Cases 6–7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, ¶ 32; Continental Can v. Commission, Case 6/72, 
[1973] E.C.R. 215, ¶ 20–26. 
54. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1980). 
55. See Vickers, supra note 52, at 247. 
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Commission and the courts took a formalistic approach where 
abuse of a dominant position was assessed based on effects on the 
competitive structure of the market or the conduct’s form, rather 
than on the actual effects on consumers.56 The case law indicates 
that article 102 TFEU was perceived as being used by the 
Commission and courts to protect competitors, not 
competition.57 This is seen in the early case of Commercial 
Solvents58 and in the more recent case of British Airways.59 In 
contrast, the United States’ Sherman Act does not prohibit the 
exercise of legitimate monopoly power; instead, success in a 
competitive market is allowed to flourish.60 What is of concern to 
U.S. regulators is the use of antitrust law to protect and promote 
consumer welfare and efficiency—and this underpins the enquiry 
as to whether there is illegal acquisition or maintenance of a 
monopoly position in the market which produces anti-
competitive effects.61 
Very few issues of individual consumer harm have emerged 
in the discussions of the purpose of article 102 TFEU, in litigation 
from consumers claiming damages, or in an injunction to 
compensate for private harm suffered by the abuse of a dominant 
position.62 Even now, after the Commission’s new guidelines, 
 
56. See Michelin v. Commission, Case T-203/01, [2003] E.C.R. II-4071, ¶¶ 236–37; 
AKZO v. Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. I-3359, ¶¶ 6–7 (defining dominant 
position in terms of effect on the market); Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 
85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, at 467. 
57. See Eleanor M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26(2) WORLD 
COMPETITION 149 (2003); Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary 
Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 20 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 373 (2002). 
58. Commercial Solvents, [1974] E.C.R. 223, ¶ 32. 
59. British Airways v. Commission, Case C-95/04P, [2007] E.C.R. I-2331, ¶ 133. 
60. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 399 (2004). 
61. See Frank H. Easterbrook, When is it Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for 
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 345 (2003) (arguing that courts 
should not determine whether corporations have engaged in exclusionary practices). 
62. Private enforcement of article 102 TFEU depends on an individual’s right to 
sue based on legal standing and harm suffered. Although injunction may be seen as a 
useful remedy, the usual remedy for a breach of competition rules will be damages to 
compensate for harm suffered. Private enforcement does not address any of the central 
ideas of the modern purpose of article 102 TFEU counteracting general welfare losses, 
for example, where an abuse of a dominant position can lead to a decrease in 
innovation and a loss in dynamic efficiency where consumers are deprived of better 
quality products. An argument has been made for the optimal use of private 
enforcement of article 102 TFEU where there is a strong correlation between individual 
damages and negative welfare effects of the dominant firm’s behavior. See Mark-Oliver 
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criticisms are leveled at the lack of clarity of the purpose of article 
102 TFEU and how an effective consumer voice can be found.63 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Commission showed 
greater interest in the enforcement of article 102 TFEU, and new 
concepts emerged to capture perceived threats to the internal 
market. As the case law shows, neither the Commission nor the 
European courts have wholeheartedly embraced clear, consistent 
criteria for managing the role of article 102 TFEU. 
In contrast to the soft law guidance and ex ante guidance in 
the form of block exemptions provided under article 101 TFEU, 
and guidelines for mergers, the Commission guidance on article 
102 TFEU is remarkable for its paucity64 despite the fact that the 
Commission used soft governance techniques in its 1965 
Memorandum on Concentrations issued to define abuse under 
the EEC Treaty.65 Similarly, article 102 TFEU lagged behind 
article 101 TFEU (article 81 EC) with respect to using economic 
assessment of the effects of a dominant undertaking’s behavior 
on the market.66 This weakness is acknowledged in the 
preliminary public announcements on why article 102 TFEU was 
to be modernized.67 On the other hand, the Commission and the 
courts have allowed article 102 TFEU to evolve and address 
modern competition issues by considering new concepts. The 
next section of this Article addresses whether these concepts have 
been rigorously thought through, are sustainable, and are 
sufficiently flexible to provide generic responses to sector-specific 
dominance issues and allow for the modernization of article 102 
TFEU. 
 
Mackenrodt, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in Unilateral Conduct Cases 32 
(Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper 
Series No.09-11, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470611. 
63. See Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, The Conflict between Economic Freedom and Consumer 
Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 EC, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 329, 344 (2007); 
Laura Parret, Do We (Still) Know What We Are Protecting?, 49 (Tilec Discussion Paper, 
University of Tilburg, The Netherlands, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1379342. 
64. Although guidance is available in the liberalization of markets process, as seen 
in notices published in the telecommunications and postal sectors. 
65. The memorandum is dated December 1, 1965 but is usually referred to as the 
1966 Memorandum from the date of its publication. 
66. Kroes, supra note 41; Philip Lowe, Speech at the Thirtieth Annual Conference 
on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 23, 
2003). 
67. See Kroes, supra note 41; Lowe, supra note 66. 
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IV. ADAPTATION: SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST? 
A. Special Responsibility 
The most important legal doctrine that has emerged in 
relation to article 102 TFEU (article 82 EC) is the idea that a 
dominant undertaking has a special responsibility to the market. 
This doctrine highlights the difference in thinking between the 
United States and the EU regarding the existence of dominant 
firms. Kavanagh, Marshall, and Niels argue that the notion that a 
dominant firm is a threat to competition is deeply embedded in 
the ordo-liberal school of thought, which influenced the early 
development of competition law in Europe.68 Individual freedom 
is the primary objective of competition policy: “A dominant firm 
is in effect regarded as the proverbial bull in the china shop—it 
must be restrained to prevent it from inflicting further damage to 
its already fragile surroundings.”69 
The concept of special responsibility was first mentioned in 
the Michelin I case in 1983.70 The special responsibility is not 
intended to impair undistorted competition in the market.71 
Such a responsibility is related to EU competition law protecting 
competitors in the market and the competitive structure of the 
market. It goes further than pure competition law principles in 
that it suggests a responsibility or duty placed upon private 
undertakings normally associated with public law duties, 
suggesting that in certain situations private power should 
exercise self-restraint.72 
The actual content of the special responsibility duty is vague. 
In Compagnie Maritime Belge73 the CFI stated that the special 
responsibility of dominant undertakings is that they are subject to 
article 102 TFEU when non-dominant undertakings are not. This 
 
68. See James Kavanagh, Niel Marshall & Gunnar Niels, Reform of Article 82 EC-Can 
the Law and Economics Be Reconciled?, in ARTICLE 82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT 
EVOLUTION 3 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009). 
69. Gunnar Niels & Helen Jenkins, Reform of Article 82: Where the Link between 
Dominance and Effects Breaks Down 26 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 605, 605 (2005). 
70. Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, ¶ 56. 
71. Id. 
72. See GUILIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER: THE DILEMMA 
OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE HISTORY OF THE MARKET 65–66 (1997). 
73. Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v. Commission, Joined Cases T-24–26 & 
28/93, [1996] E.C.R. II-1201, ¶¶ 106–07. 
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implies that there should be a degree of certainty as to the scope 
of article 102 TFEU. But in fact, an uncertainty is created by the 
lack of specificity of the obligations imposed by the idea of a 
special relationship created in the case law. 
A special relationship suggests that the obligation applies ex 
ante, and is a continuing obligation. This creates problems where 
an undertaking is found to be in a dominant position under 
unusual market circumstances, or where a low market share is 
used to identify dominance in the market.74 The obligation is 
questionable given that dominance in itself is not illegal and 
there are legal means by which a dominant undertaking can 
maintain or even improve its dominance. 
The concept of special responsibility would be better suited 
to play a part of the concept of super dominance, which is 
discussed in the next section of this Article. It has also been 
questioned whether the idea of special responsibility has a role to 
play in the modernization of article 102 TFEU, which focuses 
upon consumer welfare and a takes a more economic-effects 
approach to the enforcement.75 As Kavanagh et al. point out, 
modern economic theory shows that competitive dynamics 
function even where large firms are present in markets and that 
large firms can improve markets’ competitive dynamics and 
efficiency, thereby bringing consumer benefits.76 
B. Superdominance 
A better understanding of the concept of special 
responsibility of dominant undertakings would be to attach the 
idea to another concept developed by the Commission and the 
courts: superdominance. Where undertakings have very large 
market shares, one sees an idea of even greater responsibility 
 
74. In EU competition law there is no safe harbor for low market shares because 
the Commission and courts will take other indicators into consideration. See, e.g., British 
Airways v. Commission, Case T-219/99, [2003] E.C.R. II-5917, ¶ 211. The Commission 
and CFI upheld a finding of dominance on a market share of 39.7 percent. Id. 
75. Rafael Allendesalazar, Can We Finally Say Farewell to the “Special Responsibility” of 
Dominant Companies?, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED 
APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 319 (Clause Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008). 
76. See Kavanagh et al., supra note 68, at 3. 
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toward the market. In the Commission’s Microsoft77 decision the 
Commission identifies the market share as over ninety percent of 
the relevant market, putting Microsoft in a “quasi-monopoly” 
position and an “overwhelmingly dominant position.”78 
At the national level, the United Kingdom’s Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) has used a variety of different terms to 
capture the market power of a firm holding a very high 
percentage share of a market: “quasi-monopoly,” “dominance 
approaching a monopoly,” “super-dominance,” and 
“overwhelming dominance.”79 In Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings 
Ltd Subsidiaries v. Director General of Fair Trading,80 the 
undertaking held ninety percent of the market share and had 
only one significant competitor during the period of the abuse of 
the dominant position. Here the CAT applied UK antitrust law 
(which is identical in wording to article 102 TFEU) and held that 
Napp is a superdominant undertaking in both the hospital and 
community segments, with, in consequence, a particularly 
onerous responsibility not to further impair the structure of the 
existing feeble competition.81 
The European courts have not entirely embraced super 
dominance. The term “super dominance” was first used by 
Advocate General Fennelly in Compagnie Maritime Belge,82 where 
members of a liner conference held a ninety percent market 
share. The Advocate General argued that a superdominant 
company had a duty not to preclude competition in the market.83 
The term “superdominance” was not used by the Court. Instead 
the Court reverts back to the language of special responsibility: 
“[T]he undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to 
allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on 
 
77. Commission Decision No. C(2004)900, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2004), 
cited in 2007 O.J. L 32/23 (Microsoft), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf. 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal Case No. 1001/1/1/01, 
2002, ¶ 219 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Compagnie Maritime Belge 
Transports SA v. Commission, Joined Cases C-395–96/96P, [2000] E.C.R. I-1365). 
80. Id. ¶ 338. 
81. Id. ¶ 337. 
82. Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] E.C.R. 
I-1365, ¶137. 
83. Id. 
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the common market.”84 In Tetra Pak II85 the Court refers to a 
position of “quasi-monopoly” whereas in Irish Sugar the Court of 
First Instance refers to the “extensive” dominant position.86 
Article 102 TFEU does not distinguish the behavior of a 
superdominant undertaking from that of a dominant 
undertaking. Nor does article 102 TFEU refer to degrees of 
dominance or different responsibilities of dominant 
undertakings. The Court in Tetra Pak II held that the scope of 
the special responsibility of a dominant undertaking should be 
assessed in the special circumstances of each case.87 In its 
guidance the Commission suggested that the degree of dominance 
will be a factor in establishing foreclosure effects: “in general, the 
stronger the dominant position, the higher the likelihood that 
conduct protecting that position leads to anticompetitive 
foreclosure.”88 This suggests that the Commission presumes that 
large market shares are anticompetitive.89 
The concept is also susceptible to criticism from an 
economics perspective. Economic analysis recognizes the concept 
of monopoly and the concept of a dominant price-setting 
undertaking that faces a competitive fringe acting as price-takers. 
In each of the cases where superdominance comes into play, it 
could be argued that it is the nature of the abuse that is at issue, 
not the nature of the dominance of the undertaking.90 However, 
Appeldoorn argues that in cases like Microsoft, where large 
market shares are identified, the Commission attaches duties to 
the undertaking based on its size and not its behavior.91 Thus “if 
 
84. Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] E.C.R. I-1365, ¶ 37. 
85. Tetra Pak v. Commission (Tetra Pak II), Case C-333/94P, [1996] E.C.R. I-5951, 
¶¶ 28, 31, 48. 
86. Irish Sugar v. Commission, Case T-228/97, [1999] E.C.R. II-2969, ¶ 185. 
87. Tetra Pak II, [1996] E.C.R. I-5951, ¶ 24. 
88. Commission Communication, supra note 15, 2009 O.J. C 45, at 10. 
89. See Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Compagnie Maritime Belge 
Transports SA v. Commission, Joined Cases C-395/96P & C-396/96P, [2000] E.C.R. I-
1365, ¶ 142; see also Irish Sugar, [1999] E.C.R. II-2969, ¶ 186. 
90. Cf. O’Donoghue & Padilla, supra note 31, at 168 (“Undertakings with a high 
degree of market power usually have greater incentive and ability to abuse their 
dominance.”). 
91. J. Appeldoorn, He Who Spareth His Rod, Hateth His Son? Microsoft, Super-
dominance and Article 82 EC, 26 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 653, 656–57 (2005). 
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a dominant undertaking has a ‘special’ responsibility, a 
superdominant has one that is even greater.”92 
C. Essential Facilities 
One aspect of achieving dominance or a monopoly is that 
the dominant firm will own and regulate access to facilities in 
upstream or downstream markets to which access is essential for 
any competition to emerge or exist. In both the United States 
and the EU, a dominant firm’s refusal to deal is not necessarily 
illegal. Both jurisdictions have a commitment to freedom to 
contract and the right to own and manage property rights. Both 
jurisdictions acknowledge that courts are not the best place to 
determine access to property rights, and that such schemes are 
better left to regulators. Both jurisdictions are also acutely aware 
of the disincentives a “duty-to-deal” principle may have on 
successful dominant firms, such as disincentives to invest and 
innovate if the outcomes have to be shared.93 In recent years the 
problems of superdominance have shown that in certain sectors, 
particularly the pharmaceutical, media, and information 
technology sectors, a monopolistic or near-monopolistic firm 
may reach a stage of vertical integration of products that leaves 
consumers with little choice, and the firm itself finds it is going 
nowhere in terms of its own capacity to innovate, resulting in a 
cannibalization of its own products. 
It has long been established that in certain situations under 
article 102 TFEU, a dominant undertaking has a duty to deal with 
a third party with whom it may not wish to commence, or 
continue, a commercial relationship.94 This may be to exclude 
 
92. R. WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 185, (6th ed. 2009). 
93. See Verizon Commc’n. Inc., 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004); Oscar Bronner GmbH v. 
Mediaprint Zeitungs - und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-
7791; see also Peter Thalmann, Refusals to Deal—The Role of Long-Term Effects in the Design 
of Remedies 17 (The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy, 
Working Paper No. CCLP (L) 20), available at http://www.competition-law.ox.ac.uk/
lawvle/users/ezrachia/CCLP_L_.20.pdf. 
94. See, e.g., Télémarketing (CBEM) v. SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de 
télédiffusion (CLT), Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261; Hugin Kassaregister AB & Hugin 
Cash Registers Ltd. v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869; Istituto 
Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, Joined Cases 
6–7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223. 
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competition from the market95 or to control the market through 
horizontal and vertical distribution conditions which make it 
difficult for customers and consumers to deal with competitors.96 
The Commission had looked to import the idea of an 
“essential facilities” doctrine into EU antitrust law from U.S. law 
in a series of interventions in the transport sector. In a case 
involving access to port services and facilities, the Commission 
used the phrase “essential facilities.”97 But analysis of U.S. and 
EU case law reveals that such a doctrine is tenuous in both 
jurisdictions and has been used in different economic contexts. 
In the United States, essential facilities issues began with requests 
for access to physical networks and facilities where a dominant 
firm controlled a bottleneck, but in modern times have tended to 
emerge in cases involving joint ventures and monopoly networks. 
In the EU, the cases started by the Commission held similar 
attributes in terms of access to physical networks and bottlenecks, 
but they have focused more on access to intellectual property 
rights to obtain access to established distribution networks.98 In 
commentaries on U.S. law, the idea of an essential facilities 
doctrine is traced back to a U.S. Supreme Court decision, United 
States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n,99 although it is recognized that 
the term was not actually used in the ruling. Lower courts in the 
United States have used the terminology,100 but in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the U.S. 
Supreme Court cast serious doubt on whether an “essential 
 
95. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Commercial 
Solvents, [1974] E.C.R. 223. 
96. See, e.g., United Brands Co. and United Brands Cont’l B.V. v. Commission, Case 
C-27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207 (United Brands refused to continue supplying a long-
standing Danish ripener and distributor, Olesen, with trademarked Chiquita bananas 
because Olesen had dealt and been involved in advertising and promoting a rival’s 
bananas); Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, 
Joined Cases C-468–78/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7139 (holding that a dominant undertaking 
in the pharmaceuticals market abuses its position where it refuses to meet ordinary 
orders from wholesalers engaged in promoting parallel exports). 
97. Commission Decision IV/34.174, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255 (B&I Line/Sealink 
Harbours). 
98. See id. 
99. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
100. See, e.g., MCI Commc’n. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
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facilities” doctrine was sustainable in U.S. antitrust law.101 In the 
EU, the Commission and Advocates General have used the 
concept, but only the CFI (now the General Court) has referred 
specifically to the term “essential facilities.”102 
In looking at a refusal to deal as an infringement of article 
102 TFEU, the ECJ held that a refusal to license registered 
designs to produce car panels was not in itself an abuse of a 
dominant position.103 In later cases the Court was willing to set 
out the narrow terms on which a duty to deal (or to license) may 
be created. 
In Oscar Bronner the ECJ set out the clearest set of criteria to 
apply to “a-duty-to-deal” under a claim to physical property 
access (here a regional newspaper demanded access to a national 
newspaper’s distribution network) using article 102 TFEU.104 The 
Court held that a refusal to deal would only be an abuse under 
article 102 TFEU where there are indispensable goods or 
services, and the refusal to deal would be likely to eliminate all 
competition in the downstream market.105 Three criteria 
emerged from this ruling: (1) the refusal to deal must be likely to 
eliminate all competition from the downstream market; (2) it is 
not capable of justification; and (3) access to the facility is 
indispensable to the competitor’s business, with no actual or 
potential substitute for it.106 The Court gives further clarification 
of what is “indispensable” in this context: it would not be 
economically viable for the competitor to create the facility.107 
Other cases have applied the “duty-to-deal” to intellectual 
property rights: Magill,108 IMS Health,109 and Microsoft.110 Magill 
 
101. Verizon Commc’n. Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410–12 
(2004). 
102. See e.g., Coe Clerici Logistics SpA v. Commission, Case T-52/00, [2003] E.C.R. 
II-2123, ¶¶ 73, 98–99, 104. 
103. AB, Volvo v. Erick Veng Ltd., Case C-238/87, [1988] E.C.R. I-6211, ¶ 8. 
104.  Oscar Bronner GmbH v. Mediaprint Zeitungs - und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-7791, ¶ 41. 
105. Id. ¶¶ 41–46. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. ¶ 41. 
108. Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission (Magill), Joined Cases C-241 & 
242/91P, [1995] E.C.R. I-743, ¶¶ 10–11, 49–57. 
109. IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-5039, ¶¶ 31–52. 
110. Microsoft v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II-3601, ¶¶ 284–88, 
1329–30. 
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concerned a refusal to grant a license to create a comprehensive 
weekly television listing guide which would create a new product 
and would benefit consumers since each television firm owning 
the copyright to its own listings created individual guides.111 The 
ECJ ruled that a refusal to deal would not in itself constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position but may do so in exceptional 
circumstances.112 Here there were exceptional circumstances: (1) 
a new product that would benefit consumers was prevented from 
entering the market; (2) there was no justification for the refusal 
to grant the license; and (3) the television broadcasters, contrary 
to the principles of Commercial Solvents,113 had reserved to 
themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides, 
excluding all competition from that market.114 Just as the raw 
material was indispensable in Commercial Solvents, here the license 
was indispensable for the creation of a new comprehensive 
television guide. Thus, in Magill the ECJ held that a refusal to 
license an intellectual property right could be an abuse of a 
dominant position in exceptional circumstances.115 In this case, 
access to raw data protected by intellectual property rights owned 
by the dominant undertakings prevented the creation of a new 
competitor product on the market. 
In contrast, in another intellectual property case, IMS 
Health, the Court refined the three cumulative conditions that 
must be satisfied for finding an abuse of a dominant position 
where there is a refusal to deal.116 In this case, the competitor 
wanted to enter a dominated market and duplicate the products 
offered.117 The Court stated that this was not sufficient to grant a 
right of access to the intellectual property.118 In Tierce Ladbroke SA 
v. Commission, the CFI found that a refusal to license French 
televised broadcasts of horse races to Ladbrokes betting offices in 
Belgium was not an abuse of a dominant position because having 
 
111. Magill, [1995] E.C.R. I-743, ¶¶ 1–3. 
112. Id. ¶¶ 49–57. 
113. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. 
Commission, Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, ¶¶ 23–25, 27–29. 
114. Magill, [1995] E.C.R. I-743, ¶¶ 54–56. 
115. Id. ¶ 54; see also Tierce Ladbroke SA v. Commission, Case T-504/93, [1997] 
E.C.R. II-923, ¶ 115. 
116. IMS Health, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-5039, ¶ 38. 
117. Id. ¶ 49. 
118. Id. ¶¶ 39–52. 
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the televised broadcasts was not necessary for Ladbroke’s betting 
business and the refusal did not prevent the emergence of a new 
product on the market.119 
In Microsoft, the Commission expanded upon the duty to 
supply with a set of unbundling and monitoring remedies.120 The 
Commission found that Microsoft had abused its dominant 
position in the personal computer operating system market by 
refusing to share interoperability information with competitors 
who needed this essential information to enter and compete in 
the workgroup server market.121 
The essential facilities doctrine has a narrow application in 
EU law. It is used only where a dominant undertaking holds a 
monopoly position and controls an essential facility thereby 
creating a bottleneck over one stage of production to another, or 
one market to another, or in the case of physical facilities (such 
as airline routes, ports, harbors), physical access to markets and 
outlets. In intellectual property law, it has a very narrow 
application where denial of access would stifle innovation and 
deny consumers new products. More precisely, the “duty-to-deal” 
is better described as a duty to provide or share the dominant 
undertaking’s facilities. 
D. Essential Services 
The term “essential facilities” has confusingly been 
associated with the idea of “essential services” in the context of 
relaxing the application of the internal market and competition 
rules for essential (or public) services provision in competitive 
markets.122 Competitors and consumers have brought complaints 
where economic services are provided under state regulation and 
the state either does not provide good enough services or cannot 
meet demand. The state may raise article 106(2) TFEU (article 
 
119. Ladbroke, [1997] E.C.R. II-923, ¶¶ 123–34. 
120. Commission Decision No. C(2004)900, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2004) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf; 
Microsoft v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 284–88, 1329–30. 
121. Id. 
122. Cosmo Graham, Essential Facilities and Services of General Interest, 1 DIRITTO E 
POLITICHE DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 22 (2007). 
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86(2) EC)123 as a shield, but only where there is a state monopoly 
or an undertaking with special or exclusive rights to provide a 
service of general economic interest. The justification for the 
relaxation of the rules of competition law is that the goods or 
services being provided are core activities which a Member State 
deems important to be provided locally, regionally, or nationally. 
The scope of what constitutes an essential service is in flux 
in Europe as governments attempt to cut public spending and 
roll back the welfare state by experimenting with different modes 
of funding and delivering essential services.124 At the same time. 
the free movement of persons and the concept of EU citizenship 
has opened up access to public welfare markets (on the principle 
of non-discrimination to migrant EU nationals, and in some cases 
their non-EU national families). In many Member States, such 
services may be provided by commercial operators, and 
consumers may pay for some of these services. This opening up 
of public markets to economic principles creates acute problems 
for the application of EU economic law to such hybrid goods and 
services.125 
The initial regulatory regime of liberalization in the EU has 
associated the idea of essential services with the concept of 
universal service obligations.126 In this situation either a public or 
private non-dominant undertaking may be entrusted with the 
universal service obligation—and the provision of the universal 
service obligation is encumbered with a number of standards 
relating to access, quality, price, and continuity of the service 
provided, alongside special provisions relating to vulnerable 
classes of consumers. 
More recent thinking and policy have linked essential public 
services with fundamental and human rights ideas.127 The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(“Charter”) has a general clause and a number of provisions that 
 
123. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 106(2), 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 91; EC Treaty, supra note 
5, art. 86, 2006 O.J. C. 321 E, at 76. 
124. See, Erika Szyszczak, Legal Tools in the Liberalisation of Welfare Markets, in 
INTEGRATING WELFARE FUNCTIONS INTO EU LAW—FROM ROME TO LISBON (Ruth 
Nielsen ed., 2009). 
125. See id. 
126. See DAVIES & SZYSZCZAK, supra note 7; Szyszczak, supra note 4, at chs. 5, 7. 
127. See Szyszczak, supra note 124. 
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address essential services.128 Whether these rights are justiciable is 
a contentious point. The U.K. government, for example, would 
argue that such rights are only “principles,” the view taken in a 
paper delivered by Lord Goldsmith QC in 2001.129 Lord 
Goldsmith QC was the United Kingdom’s representative to the 
convention which first drafted the Charter.130 He argued that 
there is a distinction in the Charter between civil and political 
rights, which are individual, justiciable classic rights guaranteed 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, and new 
social and economic rights, which are not justiciable but exist to 
inform policy and can be classified as principles.131 Social and 
economic rights are thus seen as aspirational. In the revised 
Explanations to the Charter132 there are examples of these 
principles: article 25 (rights of the elderly), article 26 
(integration of persons with disabilities), and article 37 
(environmental protection).133 In the revised form of the 
Charter, article 52(5) recognizes that there are differences 
between principles and rights, and the new Explanations to the 
Charter reinforce this.134 However, the explanations also state 
that some articles may contain elements of rights and principles, 
citing as examples, article 23 on equality between men and 
women, article 33 on family and professional life, and article 34 
on social security and social assistance.135 This will inevitably lead 
to requests from the national courts to the ECJ for interpretation 
of Charter provisions. 
At the national level in the United Kingdom, the Equality 
Act of 2010136 creates and extends existing duties for the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission to ensure that socio-economic 
disadvantage is addressed in a number of areas linking inequality 
and disadvantage. It also places duties upon public authorities to 
 
128. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/01. 
129. Lord Goldsmith QC, A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles, 38 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1201, 1212 (2001); SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, TENTH 
REPORT, 2007-8, H.L. 62-I. 
130. Goldsmith, supra note 129, at 1201. 
131. Id. at 1212. 
132. Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Convent 49, 
Charter 4473/00 (2000). 
133. Id. arts. 25, 26, 37. 
134. Id. art. 52(5). 
135. See id. arts. 23, 33, 34. 
136. Equality Act, 2010, c.15, (Eng.)  
  
1766 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1738 
address the quality of services delivered to disadvantaged groups. 
These developments create inroads into traditional divisions 
between public and private law, creating more onerous duties 
upon non-state, commercial bodies to think beyond freedom to 
contract and develop new redistributive roles for private law. New 
triangular relationships emerge between the state, the individual, 
and private suppliers of goods and services.137 New academic 
work has suggested that such relationships are complex, with an 
emerging series of complex inter-connecting triangular 
relationships involving regulators, public policy making bodies, 
and public enforcement bodies.138 
Within EU legislation there are mechanisms of universal 
service obligation, and EU state-aid law also recognizes that the 
antitrust rules may be relaxed where a subsidy or other favorable 
treatment (for example a tax concession) is given to a universal 
service obligation provider.139 The European Court of Justice has 
attempted to put the provision of such services on a commercial 
footing by stating that where a transparent procurement process 
is not undertaken, criteria must be applied to ensure that firms 
and undertakings delivering services of general economic 
interest are not over-subsidized and work along efficient 
principles.140 
E. Collective Dominance and Tacit Collusion 
The use of joint ventures and specialization agreements, and 
an emerging, dynamic mergers and acquisitions market, 
especially after the legal completion of the Internal Market in 
1992, created the possibility of oligopolistic markets emerging in 
a number of sectors in the European market. Article 102 TFEU 
specifies that “one or more” undertakings may enjoy a dominant 
position in the relevant market, and if such undertakings use this 
market power to maintain or increase their position in the 
 
137. See generally Gunther Teubner, After Privatisation? The Many Autonomies of 
Private Law, in FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS 
PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE LAW (Thomas Wilhelmsson & Samuli Hurri eds., 1999). 
138. Davies & Szyszczak, supra note 7. 
139. See, e.g., Altmark Trans GmbH v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, 
Case C-280/00, [2000] E.C.R. I-7747. 
140. See Erika Szyszczak, Financing Services of General Economic Interest, 67 MOD. L. 
REV. 982, 983 (2004). 
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market, this may be an abuse of a collective dominant position.141 
Thus, article 102 TFEU differs from section 2 of the Sherman Act 
which does not apply to jointly-held monopolies.142 In Europe, 
the concept of collective dominance lacks precision. Courts 
create and apply principles derived from merger cases without 
any rigorous analysis of the legal links necessary between firms in 
order to show collective market power. Where formal legal links 
are absent, the criteria necessary to show tacit collusion are 
equally under-developed. The ECJ used the idea of collective 
dominance in 1988 in a situation where undertakings had 
structural links.143 When the concept was recognized, the 
European courts held that collective dominance could be 
determined by the structure of the market and that such links 
were not a prerequisite to finding collective dominance. 
Economists recognize that an oligopoly may be able to 
coordinate the behavior of dominant undertakings and eliminate 
competition in the market by the use of tacit collusion. This 
theory has found its way into competition law through the 
concept of collective dominance. 
Collective dominance was recognized by the CFI in Società 
Italina Vetro SpA v. Commission.144 In that case the CFI recognized 
that two or more economically independent undertakings could 
collectively hold a dominant position and that there would be an 
abuse of that position if there were “economic links” between the 
two undertakings.145 Only if such links are present can the 
Commission effectively assess whether there is an abuse of a 
dominant position. The concept is vague in its legal 
requirements and thresholds. The CFI did not provide a 
complete list of examples of “economic links” and it has been 
left to academic commentators to suggest examples of structural 
links between the two undertakings, like mutual shareholdings, 
shared management, and shared directorships in the 
undertakings. The undertakings may have horizontal agreements 
 
141. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89; EC Treaty, supra note 5, 
art. 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74. 
142. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1890). 
143. See Société Alsacienne et Lorraine de Télécommunications et d’électronique 
v. SA Novasam, Case 247/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5987, ¶¶ 21–22. 
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[1992] E.C.R. II-1403. 
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sharing common terms for commercial activities.146 There is little 
Commission or judicial guidance on the intensity of joint or 
mutual links that triggers either the reality of a collective 
dominance position or its abuse. In Irish Sugar the CFI found that 
a fifty-one percent level of cross-shareholdings and common 
directorships between Irish Sugar and one of its distributors was 
sufficient evidence of economic links between two undertakings, 
linked through vertical agreements.147 
In Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports148 and TACA149 the CFI 
found horizontal links: a tariff-fixing conference agreement 
between shipping companies, and the implementation of an 
agreement that was seen as an economic link for the purposes of 
establishing collective dominance.150 The behavior in each case 
was overt collusion,151 a price-fixing agreement normally dealt 
with using article 101 TFEU (article 81 EC).152 However, in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports, the ECJ introduced a new 
element to the concept of collective dominance by suggesting 
that “economic links” may not always be necessary for finding 
that there is a collective dominant position. Instead, a new 
element called “connecting factors” was introduced: 
The existence of an agreement or of other links in law is not 
indispensable to a finding of a collective dominant position; 
such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and 
would depend on an economic assessment, and, in 
particular, on an assessment of the market in question.153 
 
146. See ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW 924–30 (2008); 
O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 31; JONATHAN FAULL & ALI NIKPAY, THE EC LAW 
OF COMPETITION 114 (2007). 
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E.C.R. II-3275. 
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Again the vague language used by the Court led to a range 
of ideas from scholars as to what connecting factors and behavior 
would be caught by the Court’s language.154 
In a merger case, Airtours, the CFI held that the Commission 
must show that a collective dominant position existed by 
adducing convincing evidence.155 It addressed the concept of 
tacit collusion by creating a set of criteria (conditions) that the 
Commission must show for to prove collusion. The Airtours 
criteria were cited and used by the CFI in the article 102 TFEU 
case, Piau.156 The conceptual confusion over tacit collusion is 
revealed in both Airtours and Piau, where legal links between the 
firms could be found, making the issue of tacit collusion 
irrelevant.157 Piau was an agent for footballers who complained to 
the Commission that FIFA, the governing body of football, issued 
a regulation that allegedly restricted competition in the EU.158 
On investigation by the Commission, FIFA amended the 
regulation to the Commission’s satisfaction, but this did not 
satisfy Piau, who challenged the Commission’s decision.159 The 
CFI and ECJ concluded that FIFA held a dominant position, but 
had not abused the position.160 The courts’ reasoning in Piau is 
extraordinary because there was evidence that the FIFA 
regulation created legal links between football clubs in Europe. 
More recently, in a merger case, Impala, the ECJ established 
a series of principles for finding tacit collusion in the context of 
pre-existing collective dominance.161 Five of the leading 
undertakings in the recorded music market were allegedly 
colluding on prices prior to the merger of Sony and BMG.162 The 
Commission had found that the relevant market was not 
transparent enough for tacit collusion to occur.163 The CFI 
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rejected this finding, stating that the Commission had not 
applied the correct legal standards to reach its conclusion.164 
However, on appeal the ECJ held that the CFI misapplied the 
market transparency test.165 
In the Commission’s discussion paper166 a distinction was 
drawn between collective dominance as a result of agreements 
and collective dominance as a result of tacit collusion, but in the 
final guidance167, collective dominance is not discussed. 
V. MODERNIZATION THROUGH SOFT GOVERNANCE 
The concepts deployed by the Commission and the courts 
opened up ideas about the scope of regulating dominant firms in 
the market, but to date have added little to the dynamic 
application of regulating dominance in the market. New research 
suggests that there are lacunae in the scope and reach of article 
102 TFEU (article 82 EC) that article 101 TFEU (article 81 EC) 
cannot tackle. One example would be where a non-dominant 
firm is able to exercise power over other firms in the market. 
This may be to the detriment of consumers where the 
competitors’ firms are in a weaker bargaining position. Kokkoris 
identifies areas where anti-competitive conduct and harm to 
consumers may occur in the context of price discrimination and 
excessive pricing.168 
The focus of article 102 TFEU was upon the control of 
dominance in commercial markets, but intellectual property 
issues played and continue to play a prominent role. Against this 
backdrop, new problems of controlling dominance in the 
recently liberalized and emerging markets arose and have 
continued to increase rapidly due to liberalization. Traditional 
liberalized markets in the areas of utilities, postal services, and 
telecommunications are special because the price the 
Commission was willing to concede to open up markets 
previously dominated by state monopolies in Europe was to allow 
for partial liberalization, with the State retaining an interest in a 
reserved sector where special or exclusive rights can be retained 
 
164. Id. 
165. Id. ¶ 130. 
166. European Commission, supra note 13, ¶¶ 43–50. 
167. Commission Communication, supra note 15, 2009 O.J. C 45/7. 
168. IOANNIS KOKKORIS, A GAP IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARTICLE 82 (2009). 
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by the state. This has created problems where the incumbent 
operates in both the reserved sector and the newly liberalized 
commercial sector. In addition to the competition rules of article 
102 TFEU the state-aid rules have also been significant in 
identifying and regulating illegal cross-subsidization.169 Even in 
the future, when full liberalization of these markets is envisaged, 
the prominence of established market positions and high market 
shares, along with consumer loyalty and familiarity, will prove to 
be testing times for EU competition law. 
Thus, the Commission’s response to the pressures of 
modernization was narrow and limited. The discussion paper on 
article 82 EC focused merely on exclusionary abuses, and limited 
the scope of debate on article 102 TFEU thereby inviting 
criticism.170 However, the debate has centered on commercial 
markets and ignored the wider problems associated with hybrid 
markets. With a continuing reliance on free markets as the basis 
for economic and social development, and the interdependence 
of trade at the global level, there is a recognized need for 
competition law to be rigorous in addressing trade barriers that 
may be placed by non-state entities trading across borders. 
VI. MODERNIZATION THROUGH PRACTICE: PLUS LA MÊME 
CHOSE? 
The question lurking in the background is whether there is 
a general or normative approach for treating dominant firms in 
ways that enhance efficiency and consumer welfare.171 It may be 
that sector-specific approaches will be necessary and different 
processes and remedies will be offered. For example, new 
multimedia platforms pose different challenges to competition 
law than the telecommunications market. The commercialization 
of welfare services (particularly in the healthcare sector) also 
create new challenges, especially where the existence of 
 
169. The postal sector is one of the most difficult sectors to regulate in this regard. 
In the energy sector, the General Court recently leveled criticisms against the 
Commission for not applying the private investor test to France when granting a tax 
concession to Électricité de France, a public undertaking wholly owned by France. See 
Électricité de France v. Commission, Case T-156/04 [2009] E.C.R. __ (not yet reported). 
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monopoly suppliers and merger activity may foreclose markets to 
competitors and consumers, and where there are public interests 
at stake in ensuring quality, access, and continuity of such 
services for consumers.172 In the partially liberalized sectors, the 
Commission has used negotiations and accepted commitments to 
reach agreements to open up markets in the utilities sector, 
which has been difficult to liberalize fully because of incumbents 
with state support. Similar issues may arise in the postal sector, 
where the final phase of liberalization is to be implemented by 
December, 31 2010.173 There are likely to be a number of 
challenges to the incumbents’ behavior as they seek to maintain 
dominant positions. 
Where does this leave the normative elements of tackling 
abuse by dominant firms? Temple Lang argues that “insofar as 
the Guidance Paper tries to modify or extend the law, most of the 
statements made are open to serious criticism, either for 
unnecessary complexity, vagueness, anticompetitive effects, or 
difficulty of application.”174 Lang points out that discrimination 
and reprisals are related to exclusionary abuse, but are not linked 
by the Commission.175 Akman describes the limitations of the 
review as “peculiar”: 
‘[E]xclusionary’ abuses refer to those practices of a 
dominant undertaking which seek to harm the competitive 
position of its competitors or to exclude them from the 
market, whereas ‘exploitative’ abuses can be defined as 
attempts by a dominant undertaking to use the opportunities 
provided by its market strength in order to harm customers 
directly. Given that according to the EC Commission the 
ultimate objective of Article 82 EC is enhancing ‘consumer 
welfare’, one would have expected its review to a fortiori 
 
172. See Marcel Canoy & Wolf Sauter, Hospital Mergers and the Public Interest: Recent 
Developments in the Netherlands 9 (TILEC Discussion Paper, Paper No. DP2009-035, 2009), 
available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=96263 (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
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Paper No. 2010-021, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1435362. 
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Working Paper, Paper No. 65.2009, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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include an assessment of ‘exploitative’ abuses since these can 
immediately and directly harm consumers.176 
Lang argues for returning to the test in the original treaty 
provisions and as interpreted by the ECJ: an exclusionary abuse 
must involve limiting production, marketing, or technical 
development of competitors of the dominant firm, if harm is 
caused to consumers.177 
The European courts have not displayed an appreciation of 
an effects-based approach which focuses upon consumer welfare 
as the underpinning or guiding principle. In the most significant 
rulings since the Commission’s staff paper, form, rather than 
effects and impact on consumer concerns, has been the main 
focus of the courts. A clear example of the attachment to a 
formalistic approach is seen in a case on predatory pricing in the 
liberalized market of telecoms, France Télécom SA v. Commission, 
concerning predatory pricing in the market for ADSL-based 
internet services.178 Initially, consumers may benefit from 
predatory pricing because it delivers lower prices in the short 
term.179 But the CFI held that the lack of harm to consumers did 
not prevent an abuse of a dominant position. In British Airways, 
Advocate General Kokott continued with the direct protection of 
consumers by protecting the competitive structure of markets.180 
The Court held that anticompetitive practices that harm the 
effective competitive structure of a market may be indirectly 
detrimental to consumers, but that there is no requirement when 
applying article 102 TFEU to prove direct harm to consumers.181 
In Microsoft, the CFI upheld the Commission’s finding of an 
abuse of a dominant position by taking a formalistic approach 
and stating that it was not necessary to show direct effects on 
consumers stemming from the abuse of the dominant position.182 
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Moreover the Commission has ignored its own enforcement 
priorities. On September 21, 2009, the Commission published a 
provisional non-confidential version of a decision made on May 
13, 2009 fining the U.S. firm Intel €1.06 billion for abuse of a 
dominant position.183 The abuse comprised (1) granting 
conditional rebates and payments to a number of original export 
manufacturers (“OEMs”) and a large retailer of consumer 
electronics purchasing Intel’s x86 central processing units, and 
(2) paying OEMs to delay, cancel, and restrict the 
commercialization of specific Advanced Micro Devices 
products.184 Damien Geradin has criticized the decision, arguing 
that the Commission appears to have paid little attention to its 
guidance paper and attached itself to the European courts’ 
formalistic case law, which has applied “a per se prohibition” on 
conditional rebates.185 The Commission purported in the 
decision to conduct an “as efficient competitor test” to 
demonstrate that its decision is in line with the guidance paper, 
but its statement that this is not required means that it would 
have found Intel’s rebates to violate article 102 TFEU even if the 
test had shown that Intel’s rebates are not capable of foreclosing 
competition.186 The case has been appealed to the General 
Court.187 The appeal will be a major test of the EU’s resolve to 
place consumer welfare at the heart of controlling dominant 
undertakings. However, the case also raises questions of how far a 
sector-specific approach is the way forward, especially in markets 
which are dynamic and where there is a need for dominant firms 
to constantly negotiate incentives with customers where output 
increases and prices decrease. New cases may not necessarily 
shed further light on the rigor of the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities, especially where they are settled privately and through 
negotiation and commitments. A crucial test for the Commission 
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is how far it can be proactive in creating an enforcement agenda 
instead of being reactive to complaints. 
